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Abstract. We consider a setting where individuals interact in a net-
work, each choosing actions which optimize utility as a function of neigh-
bors’ actions. A central authority aiming to maximize social welfare at
equilibrium can intervene by paying some cost to shift individual in-
centives, and the optimal intervention can be computed using the spec-
tral decomposition of the graph, yet this is infeasible in practice if the
adjacency matrix is unknown. In this paper, we study the question of
designing intervention strategies for graphs where the adjacency matrix
is unknown and is drawn from some distribution. For several commonly
studied random graph models, we show that there is a single intervention,
proportional to the first eigenvector of the expected adjacency matrix,
which is near-optimal for almost all generated graphs when the budget
is sufficiently large. We also provide several efficient sampling-based ap-
proaches for approximately recovering the first eigenvector when we do
not know the distribution. On the whole, our analysis compares three
categories of interventions: those which use no data about the network,
those which use some data (such as distributional knowledge or queries
to the graph), and those which are fully optimal. We evaluate these in-
tervention strategies on synthetic and real-world network data, and our
results suggest that analysis of random graph models can be useful for
determining when certain heuristics may perform well in practice.
Keywords: random graphs, intervention, social welfare, sampling
1 Introduction
Individual decision-making in many domains is driven by personal as well as
social factors. If one wants to decide a level of time, money, or effort to exert on
some task, the behaviors of one’s friends or neighbors can be powerful influencing
factors. We can view these settings as games where agents in a network are
playing some game, each trying to maximize their individual utility as a function
of their “standalone value” for action as well as their neighbors’ actions. The
actions of agents who are “central” in a network can have large ripple effects.
Identifying and understanding the role of central agents is of high importance for
tasks ranging from microfinance [6] and vaccinations [7], to tracking the spread
of information throughout a community [8]. We view our work as providing
theoretical support for heuristic approaches to intervention in these settings.
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2 W. Brown and U. Patange
A model for such a setting is studied in recent work by Galeotti, Golub, and
Goyal [20], where they ask the natural question of how a third party should “in-
tervene” in the network to maximally improve social welfare at the equilibrium
of the game. Interventions are modeled by assuming that the third party can
pay some cost to adjust the standalone value parameter of any agent, and must
decide how to allocate a fixed budget. This may be interpreted as suggesting
that these targeted agents are subjected to advertizing, monetary incentives,
or some other form of encouragement. For their model, they provide a general
framework for computing the optimal intervention subject to any budget con-
straint, which can be expressed in terms of the spectral decomposition of the
graph. For large budgets, the optimal intervention is approximately proportional
to the first eigenvector of the adjacency matrix of the graph, a common measure
of network centrality.
While this method is optimal, and computable in polynomial time if the
adjacency matrix is known, it is rare in practice that we can hope to map all
connections in a large network. For physical networks, edges representing per-
sonal connections may be far harder to map than simply identifying the set
of agents, and for large digital networks we may be bound by computational
or data access constraints. However, real-world networks are often well-behaved
in that their structure can be approximately described by a simple generating
process. If we cannot afford to map an entire network, is optimal targeted in-
tervention feasible at all? A natural target would be to implement interventions
which are competitive with the optimal intervention, i.e. obtaining almost the
same increase in social welfare, without access to the full adjacency matrix. Un-
der what conditions can we use knowledge of the distribution a graph is drawn
from to compute a near-optimal intervention without observing the realization
of the graph? Without knowledge of the distribution, how much information
about the graph is necessary to find such an intervention? Can we ever reach
near-optimality with no information about the graph? These are the questions
we address.
1.1 Contributions
Our main result shows that for random graphs with independent edges, the first
eigenvector of the “expected adjacency matrix”, representing the probability of
each edge being included in the graph, constitutes a near-optimal intervention
simultaneously for almost all generated graphs, when the budget is large enough
and the expected matrix satisfies basic spectral conditions. We further explore
graphs with given expected degrees, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, power law graphs, and
stochastic block model graphs as special cases for which our main result holds.
In these cases, the first eigenvector of the expected matrix can often be charac-
terized by a simple expression of parameters of the graph distribution.
Yet in general, this approach still assumes a fair amount of knowledge about
the distribution, and that we can map agents in the network to their corre-
sponding roles in the distribution. We give several sampling-based methods for
approximating the first eigenvector of a graph in each of the aforementioned
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special cases, which do not assume knowledge of agent identities or distribution
parameters, other than group membership in the stochastic block model. These
methods assume different query models for accessing information about the re-
alized graph, such as the ability to query the existence of an edge or to observe a
random neighbor of an agent. Using the fact that the graph was drawn from some
distribution, we can reconstruct an approximation of the first eigenvector more
efficiently than we could reconstruct the full matrix. The lower-information set-
tings we consider can be viewed as assumptions about qualitative domain-specific
knowledge, such as a degree pattern which approximately follows an (unknown)
power law distribution, or the existence of many tight-knit disjoint communities.
We evaluate our results experimentally on both synthetic and real-world net-
works for a range of parameter regimes. We find that our heuristic interventions
can perform quite well compared to the optimal intervention, even at mod-
est budget and network sizes. These results further illustrate the comparative
efficacies of interventions requiring varying degrees of graph information under
different values for distribution parameters, budget sizes, and degrees of network
effects.
On the whole, our results suggest that explicit mapping of the connections
in a network is unnecessary to implement near-optimal targeted interventions in
strategic settings, and that distributional knowledge or limited queries will often
suffice.
1.2 Related Work
Recent work by Akbarpour, Malladi, and Saberi [3] has focused on the challenge
of overcoming network data barriers in targeted interventions under a diffusion
model of social influence. In this setting, for G(n, p) and power law random
graphs, they derive bounds on the additional number of “seeds” needed to match
optimal targeting when network information is limited. A version of this problem
where network information can be purchased is studied in [19]. Another similar
model was employed by Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar [11] where they study
optimal pricing strategies to maximize profit of a monopolist selling service to
consumers in a social network where the consumer experiences a positive local
network effect, where notions of centrality play a key role. Similar targeting
strategies are considered in [18], where the planner tries to maximize aggregate
action in a network with complementarities. [23] studies the efficacy of blind
interventions in a pricing game for the special case of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs. In
[26], targeted interventions are also studied for “linear-quadratic games”, quite
similar to those from [20], in the setting of infinite-population graphons, where
a concentration result is given for near-optimal interventions.
Our results can be viewed as qualitatively similar findings to the above results
in the model of [20]. While they have showed that exact optimal interventions
can be constructed on a graph with full information, we propose that local infor-
mation is enough to construct an approximately optimal intervention for many
distributions of random graphs. It is argued in [10] that collecting data of this
kind (aggregate relational data) is easier in real networks compared to obtaining
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full network information. We make use of concentration inequalities for the spec-
tra of random adjacency matrices; there is a great deal of work studying various
spectral properties of random graphs (see e.g. [14,15,13,2,16]). Particularly rel-
evant to us is [16], which characterizes the asymptotic distributions of various
centrality measures for random graphs. There is further relevant literature for
studying centrality in graphons, see e.g. [4]. Of relevance to our sampling tech-
niques, a method for estimating eigenvector centrality via sampling is given in
[27], and the task of finding a “representative” sample of a graph is discussed in
[25].
2 Model and Preliminary Results
Here we introduce the “linear-quadratic” network game setting from [20], also
studied in e.g. [26], which captures the dynamics of personal and social motiva-
tions for action in which we are interested.
2.1 Setting
Agents are playing a game on an undirected graph with adjacency matrix A.
Each agent takes an action ai ∈ R and obtains individual utility given by:
ui(a,A) = biai − 1
2
a2i + β
∑
j
Aijaiaj
Here, bi represents agent i’s “standalone marginal value” for action. The param-
eter β controls the effect of strategic dynamics, where a positive sign promotes
complementary behavior with neighbors and a negative sign promotes acting in
opposition to one’s neighbors. In this paper we focus on the case where each
value Aij is in {0, 1} and β > 0. The assumption that β > 0 corresponds to
the case where agents’ actions are complementary, meaning that an increase in
action by an agent will increase their neighbors’ propensities for action. 1 We
assume that bi ≥ 0 for each agent as well.
The matrix M = (I − βA) can be used to determine the best response for
each agent given their opponents’ actions. The best response vector a∗, given
current actions a, can be computed as:
a∗ = b+ βAa.
Upon solving for a∗ = a, we get that a∗ = (I − βA)−1b = M−1b, giving us the
Nash equilibrium for the game as all agents are simultaneously best responding
to each other. We show in Appendix D that when agents begin with null action
1 When β < 0, neighbors’ actions act as substitutes, and one obtains less utility when
neighbors increase levels of action. In that case, the optimal intervention for large
budgets is approximated by the last eigenvector of the graph, which measures its
“bipartiteness”.
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values, repeated best responses will converge to equilibrium, and further that
the new equilibrium is likewise reached after intervention.
Our results will apply to cases where all eigenvalues of M are almost surely
positive, ensuring invertibility. 2 The social welfare of the game W =
∑
i ui can
be computed as a function of the equilibrium actions:
W =
1
2
(a∗)>a∗
Given the above assumptions, equilibrium actions a∗i will always be non-negative.
2.2 Targeted Intervention
In this game, a central authority has the ability to modify agents’ standalone
marginal utilities from bi to bˆi by paying a cost of (bi− bˆi)2, and their goal is to
maximize social welfare subject to a budget constraint C:
max
∑
i
ui subject to
∑
i
(bi − bˆi)2 ≤ C.
Here, an intervention is a vector y = bˆ− b such that ‖y‖2 ≤ C. Let W (y) denote
the social welfare at equilibrium following an intervention y. 3 It is shown in [20]
that the optimal budget-constrained intervention for any C can be computed
using the eigenvectors of A, and that in the large-budget limit as C tends to in-
finity, the optimal intervention approaches
√
C · v1(A). Throughout, we assume
vi(A) is the unit `2-norm eigenvector associated with λi, the ith largest eigen-
value of a matrix A. We also define αi =
1
(1−βλi)2 , which is the square of the
corresponding eigenvalue of M−1. Note that we do not consider eigenvalues to be
ordered by absolute value; this is done to preserve the ordering correspondence
between eigenvalues of A and M−1. A may have negative eigenvalues, but all
eigenvalues of M−1 will be positive when βλ1 < 1, as we will ensure throughout.
The key result we use from [20] states that when β is positive, as the budget
increases the cosine similarity between the optimal intervention y∗ and the first
eigenvector of a graph, which we denote by ρ(v1(A), y
∗),4 approaches 1 at a rate
depending on the (inverted) spectral gap of the adjacency matrix.5
Our results will involve quantifying the competitive ratio of an intervention y,
which we define as W (y)W (y∗) , where W (·) denotes the social welfare at equilibrium
2 If β > 0 and M is not invertible, equilibrium actions will be infinite for all agents in
some component of the graph.
3 Unless specified otherwise, ‖·‖ refers to the `2 norm. When the argument is a matrix,
this denotes the associated spectral norm.
4 The cosine similarity of two non-zero vectors z and y is ρ(z, y) = z·y‖z‖‖y‖ . For unit
vectors x, y, by the law of cosines, ‖x− y‖2 = 2(1 − ρ(x, y)), and so 1 − ‖x−y‖2
2
=
ρ(x, y). Thus ‖x− y‖ <  for  > 0 if and only if ρ(x, y) > 1− 2/2.
5 It will sometimes be convenient for us to work with what we call the inverted spectral
gap of a matrix A, which is the smallest value κ such that |λi(A) ≤ κ · λ1(A)|.
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after an intervention vector is applied, and where y∗ = arg maxx : ‖x‖=√CW (x).
This ratio is at most 1, and maximizing it will be our objective for evaluating
interventions.
2.3 Random Graph Models
We introduce several families of random graph distributions which we consider
throughout. All of these models generate graphs which are undirected and have
edges which are drawn independently.
Definition 1 (Random Graphs with Independent Edges). A distribution
of random graphs with independent edges is specified by a symmetric matrix
A ∈ [0, 1]n×n. A graph is sampled by including each edge (i, j) independently
with probability Aij.
Graphs with given expected degrees (G(w), or Chung-Lu graphs) and stochas-
tic block model graphs, often used as models of realistic “well-behaved” networks,
are notable cases of this model which we will additionally focus on.
Definition 2 (G(w) Graphs). A G(w) graph is an undirected graph with an
expected degree sequence given by a vector w, whose length (which we denote by n)
defines the number of vertices in the graph. For each pair of vertices i and j with
respective expected degrees wi and wj, the edge (i, j) is included independently
with probability Aij =
wiwj∑
k∈[n] wk
.
Without loss of generality, we impose an ordering on wi values so that w1 ≥ w2 ≥
. . . ≥ wn. To ensure that each edge probability as described above is in [0, 1], we
assume throughout that for all vectors w we have that w1 ≤
√∑
k∈[n] wk.
G(n, p) graphs and power law graphs are well-studied examples of graphs
which can be generated by the G(w) model.6 For G(n, p) graphs, w is a uniform
vector where wi = np for each i. Power law graphs are another notable special
case where w is a power law sequence {wi}ni=1 such that wi = c (i+ i0)−
1
σ−1 for
σ > 2, some constant c > 0, and some integer i0 ≥ 0. In such a sequence, the
number of elements with value x is asymptotically proportional to 1xσ .
Definition 3 (Stochastic Block Model Graphs). A stochastic block model
graph with n vertices is undirected and has m groups for some m ≤ n. Edges
are drawn independently according to a matrix A, and the probability of an edge
between two agents depends only on their group membership. For any two groups
i and j, there is an edge probability pij ∈ [0, 1] such that Akl = pij for any agent
k in group i and agent l in group j. 7
6 There are several other well-studied models of graphs with power law degree se-
quences, such as the BA preferential attachment model, as well as the fixed-degree
model involving a random matching of “half-edges”. Like the G(w) model, the latter
model can support arbitrary degree sequences. We restrict ourselves to the indepen-
dent edge model described above.
7 If m = n, the stochastic block model can express any distribution of random graphs
with independent edges, but will be most interesting when there are few groups.
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For each graph model, one can choose to disallow self-loops by setting Aii = 0
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as is standard for G(n, p) graphs. Our results will apply to both
cases.
3 Approximately Optimal Interventions
The main idea behind all of our intervention strategies is to target efforts pro-
portionally to the first eigenvector of the expected adjacency matrix. Here we
assume that this eigenvector is known exactly. In Section 4, we discuss cases
when an approximation of the eigenvector can be computed with zero or min-
imal information about the graph. Our main theorem for random graphs with
independent edges shows conditions under which an intervention proportional
to the first eigenvector of the expected matrix A is near-optimal.
We define a property for random graphs which we call (, δ)-concentration
which will ensure that the expected first eigenvector constitutes a near-optimal
intervention. In essence, this is an explicit quantification of the asymptotic prop-
erties of “large enough eigenvalues” and “non-vanishing spectral gap” for se-
quences of random graphs from [16]. Intuitively, this captures graphs which are
“well-connected” and not too sparse. One can think of the first eigenvalue as a
proxy for density, and the (inverse) second eigenvalue as a proxy for regularity
or degree of clustering (it is closely related to a graph’s mixing time). Both are
important in ensuring concentration, and they trade off with each other (via the
spectral gap condition) for any fixed values of  and δ.
Definition 4 ((, δ)-Concentration). A random graph with independent edges
specified by A satisfies (, δ)-concentration for , δ ∈ (0, 1) if:
1. The largest expected degree dmax = maxi
∑
j∈[n]Aij is at least
4
9 log(2n/δ)
2. The inverted spectral gap of A is at most κ
3. The quantity λ1(A) · (1− κ2) is at least 1024
√
dmax log(2n/δ)
2
Theorem 1. If A satisfies (, δ)-concentration, then with probability at least
1− δ, the competitive ratio of y = √Cv1(A) for a graph drawn from A is at least
1−  for a sufficiently large budget C if the spectral radius of the sampled matrix
A is less than 1/β.
The concentration conditions are used to show that the relevant spectral
properties of generated graphs are almost surely close to their expectations, and
the constraint on β is necessary to ensure that actions and utilities are finite at
equilibrium.8 The sufficient budget will depend on the size of the spectral gap
of A, as well as the standard marginal values. For example, if λ1 > 2|λi| holds
in the realized graph for all i > 1, then a budget of C = 256 · ‖b‖2 /(βλ1(A))2
8 The spectral radius condition holds with probability 1 − δ when 1/β is at least
λ1(A) +
√
4dmax log(2n/δ) (follows from e.g. [15], see Appendix E.2 for details).
8 W. Brown and U. Patange
will suffice. Intuitively, a large β would mean more correlation between neigh-
bors’ actions at equilibrium. A large λ1
(
A
)
would mean a denser graph (more
connections between agents) in expectation and a large  would mean that the
realized graph is more likely to be close to expectation. All of these conditions
reduce the required budget because a small intervention gets magnified by agent
interaction. Further, the smaller the magnitude of initial b, the easier it is to
change its direction.
The proof of Theorem 1 is deferred to Appendix C. At a high level, our results
proceed by first showing that the first eigenvector is almost surely close to v1(A),
then showing that the spectral gap is almost surely large enough such that the
first eigenvector is close to the optimal intervention for appropriate budgets. A
key lemma for completing the proof shows that interventions which are close to
the optimal intervention in cosine similarity have a competitive ratio close to 1.
Lemma 1. Let b be the vector of standalone values, and assume that C >
max(‖b‖2 , 1). For any y where ‖y‖2 = C and ρ(y, y∗) > γ for some γ, the
competitive ratio of y is at least 1− 4√2(1− γ).
The main idea behind this lemma is a smoothness argument for the welfare
function. When considering interventions as points on the sphere of radius
√
C,
small changes to an intervention cannot change the resulting welfare by too
much. This additionally implies that when a vector y is close to y∗, the exact
utility of y∗ for some budget C can be achieved by an intervention proportional
to y with a budget C ′ which is not much larger than C.
In Appendix A, we give a specialization of Theorem 1 to the case of G(w)
graphs. There, the expected first eigenvector is proportional to w when self-loops
are not removed. We give more explicit characterizations of the properties for
G(w), G(n, p), and power law graphs which ensure the above spectral conditions
(i.e. without relying on eigenvalues), as well as a budget threshold for near-
optimality. We discuss the steps of the proof in greater detail, and they are
largely symmetric to the steps required to prove Theorem 1.
4 Centrality Estimation
The previous sections show that interventions proportional to v1(A) are often
near-optimal simultaneously for almost all graphs generated by A. While we
often may have domain knowledge about a network which helps characterize its
edge distribution, we still may not be able to precisely approximate the first
eigenvector of A a priori. In particular, even if we believe our graph comes from
a power law distribution, we may be at a loss in knowing which vertices have
which expected degrees.
In this section, we discuss approaches for obtaining near-optimal interven-
tions without initial knowledge of A. We first observe that “blind” interventions,
which treat all vertices equally in expectation, will fail to approach optimality.
We then consider statistical estimation techniques for approximating the first
eigenvector which leverage the special structure of G(w) and stochastic block
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model graphs. In each case, we identify a simple target intervention, computable
directly from the realized graph, which is near-optimal when (, δ)-concentration
is satisfied. We then give efficient sampling methods for approximating these tar-
get interventions. Throughout Section 4, our focus is to give a broad overview
of these techniques rather than to present them as concrete algorithms, and we
frequently omit constant-factor terms with asymptotic notation.
4.1 Suboptimality of Blind Interventions
Here we begin by showing that when the spectral gap is large, all interventions
which are far from the optimal intervention in cosine similarity will fail to be
near-optimal even if the budget is very large.
Lemma 2. Assume that C is sufficiently large such that the role of standalone
values is negligible. For any y where ‖y‖2 = C and ρ(y, y∗) < γ, the competitive
ratio is bounded by
γ2
(
1− α2
α1
)
+
α2
α1
+ 2
√
α2
α1
,
where αi is the square of the ith largest eigenvalue of M
−1.
This tells us that if one were to design an intervention without using any in-
formation about the underlying graph, the intervention is unlikely to do well
compared to the optimal one for the same budget unless eigenvector centrality
is uniform, as in the case of G(n, p) graphs. Thus, there is a need to try to learn
graph information to design a close-to-optimal intervention. We discuss methods
for this next.
4.2 Degree Estimation in G(w) Graphs
For G(w) graphs, we have seen that expected degrees suffice for near-optimal
interventions, and we show that degrees can suffice as well.
Lemma 3. If a G(w) graph specified by A satisfies (, δ)-concentration, then
with probability at least 1−O(δ),
‖w − w∗‖ ≤ O( ‖w‖),
where w∗ is the empirical degree vector, and the intervention proportional to w∗
obtains a competitive ratio of 1−O() when the other conditions for Theorem 1
are satisfied.
Thus, degree estimation is our primary objective in considering statistical
approaches. As we can see from the analysis in Theorems 1 and 2, if we can
estimate the unit-normalized degree vector w∗ to within  `2-distance, our com-
petitive ratio for the corresponding proportional intervention will be 1 − O().
Our approaches focus on different query models, respresenting the types of ques-
tions we are allowed to ask about the graph; these query models are also studied
for the problem of estimating the average degree in a graph [22,17]. If we are
allowed to query agents’ degrees, near-optimality follows directly from the above
lemma, so we consider more limited models.
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Edge Queries. Suppose we are allowed to query whether an edge exists between
two vertices. We can then reduce the task of degree estimation to the problem
of estimating the mean of n biased coins, where for each vertex, we “flip” the
corresponding coin by picking another vertex uniformly at random to query.
By Hoeffding and union bounds, O
(
n
2 log
(
n
δ
))
total queries suffice to ensure
that with probability 1 − δ, each degree estimate is within n additive error.
Particularly in the case of dense graphs, and when  is not too small compared
to 1/n, this will be considerably more efficient than reconstructing the entire
adjacency matrix. In particular, if ‖w‖1 = Θ(n2), the above error bound on
additive error for each degree estimate directly implies that the estimated degree
vector wˆ is within `1 (and thus `2) distance of O( ‖w‖2).
Random Neighbor Queries. Suppose instead we are restricted to queries
which give us a uniformly random neighbor of a vertex. We give an approach
wherein queries are used to conduct a random walk in the graph. The stationary
distribution is equivalent to the the first eigenvector of the diffusion matrix
P = AD−1, where D is the diagonal matrix of degree counts.9 We can then learn
estimates of degree proportions by sampling from the stationary distribution via
a random walk.
The mixing time of a random walk on a graph determines the number of steps
required such that the probability distribution over states is close to the station-
ary distribution in total variation distance. We can see that for G(w) graphs sat-
isfying (, δ)-concentration with a large enough minimum degree, mixing times
will indeed be fast.
Lemma 4. For G(w) graphs satisfying (, δ)-concentration and with wn ≥ 1 ,
the mixing time of a random walk to within  total variation distance to the
stationary distribution is O(log(n/)). Further, the largest connected component
in A contains n(1− exp (−O(1/)) vertices in expectation.
If a random walk on our graph has some mixing time t to an approximation of
the stationary distribution, we can simply record our location after every t steps
to generate a sample. Using standard results on learning discrete distributions
(see e.g. [12]), O
(
n+log(1/δ)
2
)
samples from -approximate stationary distribu-
tions suffice to approximate w∗ within `1 distance of O( ‖w∗‖) with probability
1 − δ, directly giving us the desired `2 bound. Joining this with Lemma 4, our
random walk takes a total of O
(
n+log(1/δ)
2 log
(
n

))
steps (and thus queries) to
obtain our target intervention, starting from an arbitrary vertex in the largest
connected component.
9 The stationary distribution of a random walk on a simple connected graph is di∑
j dj
for all vertices i, where di is the degree. While G(w) graphs may fail to be connected,
in many cases the vast majority of vertices will belong to a single component, and
we can focus exclusively on that component. We show this in Lemma 4.
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4.3 Matrix Reconstruction in SBM Graphs
There is a fair amount of literature on estimation techniques for stochastic
block model graphs, often focused on cases where group membership is un-
known [31,1,30,28]. The estimation of eigenvectors is discussed in [5], where
they consider stochastic block model graphs as a limit of a convergent sequence
of “graphons”. Our interest is primarily in recovering eigenvector centrality effi-
ciently from sampling, and we will make the simplifying assumption that group
labels are visible for all vertices. This is reasonable in many cases where a close
proxy of one’s primary group identifier (e.g. location, job, field of study) is visible
but connections are harder to map.
In contrast to the G(w) case, degree estimates no longer suffice for estimating
the first eigenvector. We assume that there are m groups and that we know each
agent’s group. Our aim will be to estimate the relative densities of connection
between groups. When there are not too many groups, the parameters of a
stochastic block model graph can be estimated efficiently with either edge queries
or random neighbor queries, From here, we can construct an approximation of
A and compute its first eigenvector directly. In many cases, the corresponding
intervention is near-optimal.
A key lemma in our analysis shows that the “empirical block matrix” is close
to its expectation in spectral norm. We prove this for the case where all groups
are of similar sizes, but the approach can be generalized to cover any partition.
Lemma 5. For a stochastic block model graph generated by A with m groups,
each of size O( nm ), let Aˆ denote the empirical block matrix of edge frequencies
for each group. Each entry per block in Aˆ will contain the number of edges in
that block divided by the size of the block. With probability at least 1− δ,∥∥∥A−Aˆ∥∥∥ ≤ O(max(m√log(n/δ)√
n
, log2(n/δ)
))
.
The same bound will then apply to the difference of the first eigenvectors,
rescaled by the first eigenvalues (which will also be close). Similar bounds can also
be obtained when group sizes may vary, but we stick to this case for simplicity.
Edge Queries. If we are allowed to use edge queries, we can estimate the
empirical edge frequency for each of the O(m2) pairs of groups by repeatedly
sampling a vertex uniformly from each group and querying for an edge. This
allows reconstruction of the empirical frequencies up to  error for each group
pair, with probability 1−δ, with O
(
m2
2 log(m/δ)
)
samples. For the block matrix
Aˆ of edge frequencies for all group pairs, Lemma 5 implies that this will be close
to its expectation when there are not too many groups, and so our estimation
will be close to A in spectral norm as well. If A satisfies (, δ)-concentration and
the bound from Lemma 5 is small compared to the norm of A, then the first
eigenvectors of A, A, and Aˆ will all be close, and the corresponding intervention
proportional to v1(Aˆ) will be near-optimal.
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When all group pairs may have unique probabilities, this will only provide
an advantage over a naive graph reconstruction with O(m2) queries in the case
where m = o(n). If we know that all out-group probabilities are the same across
groups, our dependence on m becomes linear, as we can treat all pairs of distinct
groups as one large group. If in-group probabilities are the same across groups
as well, the dependence on m vanishes, as we only have two probabilities to
estimate.
Random Neighbor Queries. We can also estimate the empirical group fre-
quency matrix with random neighbor queries. For each group, the row in A
corresponding to the edge probabilities with other groups can be interpreted as
a distribution of frequencies for each group. O(m2 log(
m
δ )) samples per row suf-
fice to get additive error at most  for all of the relative connection probabilities
for our chosen group. This lets us estimate each of the m rows up to scaling, at
which point we can use the symmetry of the matrix to recover an estimate of
A up to scaling by some factor. Again, when (, δ)-concentration holds and the
bound from Lemma 5 is small, the first eigenvector of this estimated matrix will
give us a near-optimal intervention.
5 Experiments
Our theoretical results require graphs to be relatively large in order for the
obtained bounds to be nontrivial. It is natural to ask how well the heuristic in-
terventions we describe will perform on relatively small random graphs, as well
as on real-world graphs which do not come from a simple generative model (and
may not have independent edges). Here, we evaluate our described interventions
on real and synthetic network data, by adjusting bi values and computing the re-
sulting welfare at equilibrium, and find that performance can be quite good even
on small graphs. Our experimental results on synthetic networks are deferred to
Appendix B.
5.1 Real Networks
To test the usefulness of our results for real-world networks which we expect to
be “well-behaved” according to our requirements, we simulate the intervention
process using network data collected from villages in South India, for purposes
of targeted microfinance deployments, from [6]. In this context, we can view
actions ai as indicating levels of economic activity, which we wish to stimulate
by increasing individual propensities for spending and creating network effects.
The dataset contains many graphs for each village using different edge sets (each
representing different kinds of social connections), as well as graphs where nodes
are households rather than individuals. We use the household dataset containing
the union of all edge sets. These graphs have degree counts ranging from 77 to
365, and our experiments are averaged over 20 graphs from this dataset. We
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plot competitive ratios while varying C (scaled by network size) and the spectral
radius of βA, fixing bi = 1 for each agent.
The expected degree intervention is replaced by an intervention proportional
to exact degree. We also fit a stochastic block model to graphs using a version
of the approach described in Section 4.3, using exact connectivity probabilities
rather than sampling. Our group labels are obtained by running the Girvan-
Newman clustering algorithm [21] on the graph, pruning edges until there are
either at least 10 clusters with 5 or more vertices or 50 clusters total. We evaluate
the intervention proportional to the first eigenvector of the reconstructed block
matrix. All interventions are compared to a baseline, where no change is applied
to b, for demonstrating the relative degree in social welfare change.
Fig. 1. Intervention in Village Graphs
In Figure 1, we find that degree interventions perform quite well, and are only
slightly surpassed by first eigenvector interventions. The stochastic block model
approach performs better than uniform when the spectral radius sufficiently
large, but is still outperformed by the degree and first eigenvector interventions.
Upon inspection, the end result of the stochastic block model intervention was of-
ten uniform across a large subgraph, with little or no targeting for other vertices,
which may be an artifact of the clustering method used for group assignment. On
the whole, we observe that minimal-information approaches can indeed perform
quite well on both real and simulated networks.
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A Graphs with Given Expected Degrees
In this section, we show a method for obtaining near-optimal interventions in
graphs generated by the G(w) model. We show that the first eigenvector of a
G(w) graph is almost surely close to w, and our intervention will simply be
proportional to w. This indicates that degree estimates are often sufficient for
near-optimal intervention. We assume that w is sorted in descending order and
that each entry is strictly positive. Our main theorem for this section holds
for all G(w) distributions which satifsy the following specialization of (, δ)-
concentration. The second condition corresponds to requiring a sufficiently large
first eigenvalue, as was the case for general random graphs; G(w) graphs do not
exhibit clustering on average, and so we do not need an additional condition for
the second eigenvalue.
Definition 5 ((, δ)-Concentration for G(w) Graphs). A G(w) graph sat-
isfies (, δ)-concentration for , δ ∈ (0, 1) if:
1. The largest expected degree w1 is at least
4
9 log(2n/δ) and at most
‖w‖
6
2. The second-order average of the expected degree sequence d˜ =
∑
i w
2
i∑
i wi
is at
least
256
(√
4w1 log(2n/δ)+1
)
2
Theorem 2. For G(w) distributions satisfying (, δ)-concentration, and for C
at least 256‖b‖
2
(βd˜)2
, with probability at least 1− δ,
W
(√
C · w‖w‖
)
W (y∗)
≥ 1− ,
where b is the vector of standalone marginal values and y∗ is the optimal inter-
vention for a budget C, if the spectral radius of A is less than 1/β.10
Our conditions ensure that the first eigenvalue of the graph is not too small,
and that the other eigenvalues are not too large in magnitude. It is worth not-
ing that 1
βd˜
is small unless the network effects in the game are negligible, in
which case we should not expect eigenvector centrality to be important for small
budgets. In Appendix A.3, we consider applications to G(n, p) and power law
graphs. Here we assume the vector w which parameterizes the graph distribution
is known, and in fact our intervention will simply be proportional to w.
In the proof of Theorem 2, we proceed by observing that the first eigenvector
of A(n) is proportional to w, and then prove that when the spectral conditions
hold, the first eigenvector of A(n) is nearly proportional to w with high prob-
ability. We then determine sufficient budget sizes such that near-optimality of
the intervention follows from Lemma 1.
10 The spectral radius of βA is less than 1 with probability 1 − δ when 1
β
<
1
d˜+
√
4w1 log(2n/δ)
.
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A.1 Proportionality of Eigenvector Centrality and Degree
Here we show that the first eigenvector of the adjacency matrix A is almost
surely close to the unit vector rescaling of w. We first observe that this holds in
the standard version of the G(w) model which allows for self-loops, and then we
show that the first eigenvector does not change by much upon pruning loops.
Lemma 6. For G(w) graph distributions, any eigenvector of A corresponding
to a non-zero eigenvalue is proportional to w.
It can be checked that up to scaling, w is the unique vector which satisfies
the eigenvalue equation for a non-zero eigenvalue. As all rows and columns of A
are proportional to w, there is only one non-zero eigenvalue. From the eigenvalue
equation it is simple to check that the non-zero eigenvalue λ1(A) will be equal
to the second-order average degree
∑
i w
2
i∑
i wi
.
In this formulation of the G(w) model, agents are allowed to have self-loops
with positive probability. We note now that even if we remove the possibility of
self-loops by setting the diagonal entries of A to 0, which in turn will remove
the rank-deficiency, the spectral norm between the expected matrix (with loops)
and the realized matrix (with or without loops) will be small. This in turn will
imply that the first eigenvectors of these matrices are close.
A key tool in this proof is a bound on the difference in first eigenvectors of
matrices which are close in norm when one of them has a small second eigenvalue.
We only make use of this in the case where the second eigenvalue of one matrix
is zero, but a more general version of the result, used to prove Theorem 1, is
included in Appendix C.
Lemma 7. Let A be a symmetric n× n matrix with largest absolute eigenvalue
λ1 (with multiplicity 1) and all other eigenvalues equal to 0. Let B be a symmetric
n×n matrix with largest absolute eigenvalue µ1, and suppose ‖A−B‖ ≤ η. Then,
‖v1(A)− v1(B)‖ ≤
√
2
(
1− µ1 − η
λ1
)
.
This follows from considering a decomposition of the first eigenvector of B
into a component proportional to v1(A) and one proportional to some vector
orthogonal to v1(A). Given that A−B has a small spectral norm, the image of
v1(B) in A will be large, showing that the orthogonal component is small, which
we can use to show that the eigenvectors are close.
We can then show that norm difference of the expected and realized matrices
is almost surely small using a matrix concentration bound from [15], allowing us
to apply Lemma 7 to bound the difference in their eigenvectors, as the second
eigenvalue of A is 0.
Lemma 8. If the above assumptions about the G(w) distribution are satisfied,
then with probability 1− δ it holds that:∥∥∥∥v1(A)− w‖w‖
∥∥∥∥ ≤ /8.
18 W. Brown and U. Patange
As the first eigenvector of A is proportional to w, this shows that that the first
eigenvector will be nearly proportional to w regardless of whether we allow self-
loops, and so our intervention will be close to the true graph’s first eigenvector.
Next, we will see that this implies near-optimality for a sufficiently large budget.
A.2 Bounding Suboptimality of Interventions
The previous results indicate that the first eigenvector will be close to its ex-
pectation when our assumptions hold, even upon removing self-loops. We now
give a similar results for the first and second eigenvalues, which allows us to
guarantee a sufficiently large spectral gap for M−1. First, we give a bound on
the second eigenvalue of A with the diagonal removed.
Lemma 9. Let D be the matrix which is equal to A along the diagonal and
0 elsewhere, and let λ2 denote the second-largest absolute eigenvalue of A−D.
Then,
λ2 ≤ 2w1λ1‖w‖ + 1.
This follows from a similar orthogonal decomposition approach to the proof of
Lemma 7, as well as another direct application of Lemma 7. We can then get an
absolute bound on the first and second eigenvalues of A.
Lemma 10. With probability at least 1 − δ, the second eigenvalue of A is at
most
2w1d˜
‖w‖ + 1 +
√
4w1 log(2n/δ)
and the first eigenvalue of A is at least
d˜− 1−
√
4w1 log(2n/δ).
This follows from applying the triangle inequality to Lemma 9 and Theorem 1
from [15] as well as from our observation about the first expected eigenvalue of
A. To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we can combine the previous results to
show that λ1 > 2λ2 when the stated conditions hold. Proposition 2 from [20]
allows us to use this fact to show that when budget is above our lower bound,
the first eigenvector is close to the optimal intervention in cosine similarity. We
can then show that w and the optimal intervention are close in cosine similiarity,
using Lemma 8 as a key step. Plugging this into Lemma 1 gives us the theorem.
A.3 Examples: G(n, p) and Power Law Graphs
G(n, p) graphs are perhaps the most well-studied family of random graphs, which
we can interpret as a special case of the G(w) model and give explicit conditions
for when (, δ)-concentration holds. These conditions are lower bounds on n and
p which guarantee the requirements for applying Theorem 2, and for clarity
we restate the eigenvector similarity and near-optimality results for the case of
G(n, p) graphs.
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Lemma 11. For G(n, p) graphs with p ≥ 4 log(2n/δ)9(n−1) and n at least Ω(1/4),∥∥∥∥v1(A)− 1√n
∥∥∥∥ ≤ /8.
Theorem 3. For G(n, p) graphs with p ≥ 4 log(2n/δ)9n−1 and n at least Ω(1/4),
with probability at least 1 − δ, the uniform intervention y =
√
C√
n
· 1 achieves
utility within 1−  of the optimal intervention for budgets C at least 256‖b‖2
(βnp)2
.
The constant factor for the lower bound on n we obtain in the proof of
Lemma 11 is large, but can likely be optimized, and our empirical results in
Section 5 indicate the uniform intervention is close to optimal on reasonably
small G(n, p) graphs.
This theorem also applies directly to stochastic block model graphs where
all blocks are the same size and each has the same ingroup and outgroup prob-
abilities. Here, all agents are equally central in expectation, and it is simple to
check that the first eigenvector of A will be uniform. This allows a near-optimal
intervention for sufficiently large and dense graphs without any knowledge of the
edges, connectivity probabilities, group memberships, or degrees.
We can also show that our approach is near-optimal for many power law
graphs, as introduced in Section 2. Power law graphs are a notable special case
of the G(w) model, and are often studied as models of real-world networks. Our
results hold for power law graphs where σ ∈ (2, 2.5), a range containing many
observed examples [24,9,2].
Lemma 12. For power law graphs with 2 < σ < 2.5, if we have that w1 is at
least Ω
((
log(2n/δ)
4
) 1
5−2σ
)
, then with probability at least 1− δ,∥∥∥∥v1(A)− w‖w‖
∥∥∥∥ ≤ /8.
Theorem 4. For power law graphs with 2 < σ < 2.5, if we have that w1 is
at least Ω
((
log(2n/δ)
4
) 1
5−2σ
)
, if β is small enough to ensure that βλ1(A) < 1,
then with probaility at least 1−δ, the intervention y = √C · w‖w‖1 achieves utility
within a 1− factor of the optimal intervention for budgets C at least 256‖b‖2
(βλ1(A))
2 ,
where λ1(A) = Θ(w
3−σ
1 ).
B Additional Experiments
B.1 Random Networks
We evaluate our results in simulated G(n, p) and power law graphs, analyz-
ing the competitive ratio; we compare a baseline (no intervention), expected
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degree interventions, the first eigenvector intervention (computed from the real-
ized graph), and the optimal intervention for each graph (computed via quadratic
programming).
For all experiments, we fix n = 100 and bi = 1 for each agent. For both
graph families, we experiment by independently varying the budget size C, a
distribution parameter (p or σ), and the spectral radius of βA. We plot the
competitive ratio of each heuristic intervention with the optimal intervention
as parameters are varied, and each parameter specification is averaged over 10
graph samples. We generate power law graphs according to the G(w) model with
a power law sequence, where the maximum expected degree is fixed at 25 and
the minimum is fixed at 1 for all exponent values.
Fig. 2. Intervention in G(n, p) Graphs
In G(n, p) graphs (see Figure 2), we see that the first eigenvector intervention
is close to optimal in almost all cases, and that the uniform intervention is
quite competitive as well, particularly when the graph is increasingly dense.
When the spectral radius is small, the uniform outperforms the first eigenvector
intervention as expected, it is optimal when β is 0. The small baseline values at
most points indicate that the change to social welfare from our interventions is
indeed quite drastic, even when C = ‖b‖2.
In power law graphs (see Figure 3), the uniform intervention does not perform
nearly as well unless the spectral radius is small, where it outperforms other ap-
proaches. The expected degree intervention does considerably better in general.
When σ > 2.5, where our theoretical results do not hold, we see that heuristics
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Fig. 3. Intervention in Power Law Graphs
still perform well. We expect that this is an artifact of the fixed expected degree
bounds and the small graph size. In large power law graphs, larger exponents
correspond to the graph having a smaller “core” of dense connectivity, which
can be quite important for influencing the rest of the network. Our experiments
suggest that smaller cores are less important in graphs of this size, which more
closely resemble sparse G(n, p) graphs with a few well-connected vertices.
C Omitted Proofs
First, we prove a result about general matrices that we will use later in the
proofs.
Lemma 13. For any two n× n symmetric matrices A and B, let λ1 and λ2 be
the largest (according to magnitude) eigenvalues of A, and let µ1 be the largest
(according to magnitude) eigenvalue of B (Note: By definition, ||B|| = µ1 and
||A|| = λ1). Let κ be the inverted spectral gap, i.e. |λ2| ≤ κ|λ1|. Then,
‖v(A)− v(B)‖2 ≤ 2
1− 1
λ1
√
(µ1 − η)2 − λ21κ2
1− κ2

Where v(·) is the unit eigenvector with the largest absolute eigenvalue of the
matrix ·, and η = ‖A−B‖.
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Proof. First, we observe that,
‖Av(B)‖ ≥ ‖Bv(B)‖ − ‖B −A‖ · ‖v(B)‖ = µ1 − η, (1)
by the triangle inequality. Also, we can write, v(B) = φ1v(A) + φ2w where
w ⊥ v(A) is a unit vector, and φ21 + φ22 = 1. Since w ⊥ v(A), its image under A
can at most have a magnitude of λ2. That is,
||Aw|| ≤ λ2
From our assumption, we can write
‖Av(B)‖ ≤
√
λ21φ
2
1 + λ
2
2φ
2
2
≤
√
λ21φ
2
1 + κ
2λ21φ
2
2
= λ1
√
φ21 + κ
2φ22
Combining with (1), we get
µ1 − η
λ1
≤
√
φ21 + κ
2φ22
=⇒
(
µ1 − η
λ1
)2
≤ φ21 + κ2(1− φ21)
=⇒ φ1 ≥ 1
λ1
√
(µ1 − η)2 − λ21κ2
1− κ2
Using the fact that ‖v(A)− v(B)‖ = ‖(1− φ1)v(A) + φ2w‖ =
√
(1− φ1)2 + φ22 =√
2(1− φ1), we get
‖v(A)− v(B)‖2 ≤ 2
1− 1
λ1
√
(µ1 − η)2 − λ21κ2
1− κ2
 .
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). From Lemma 13, for matrices A and A, we have
that
∥∥v1(A)− v1(A)∥∥2 ≤ 2
1− 1
λ1
√
(µ1 − η)2 − λ21κ2
1− κ2

where λ1 is the first eigenvalue of A, |λi(A)| ≤ κλ1 for all i > 1, µ1 is the first
eigenvalue of A, and η =
∥∥A−A∥∥. By the triangle inequality µ1 − η ≥ λ1 − 2η,
Targeted Intervention in Random Graphs 23
and so
∥∥v1(A)− v1(A)∥∥2 ≤ 2
1− 1
λ1
√
(λ1 − 2η)2 − λ21κ2
1− κ2

≤ 2
1− 1
λ1
√
λ21(1− κ2)− 4ηλ1
1− κ2

≤ 2
(
1−
√
1− 4η
(1− κ2)λ1
)
≤ 8η
(1− κ2)λ1
(√
1− x > 1− x, x ∈ [0, 1]) .
Since dmax ≥ 49 log(2n/δ), we have, from the proof of Theorem 1 in [15] that
η ≤ 2√dmax log(2n/δ). If λ1 ≥ 1024√dmax log(2n/δ)(1−κ2)2 , we have that
∥∥v1(A)− v1(A)∥∥2 ≤ 16√dmax log(2n/δ)
(1− κ2)λ1
≤ 2/64,
and so
∥∥v1(A)− v1(A)∥∥ ≤ /8. For a sufficiently large budget, by Proposition
2 in [20],
∥∥∥ y∗‖y∗‖ − v1(A)∥∥∥ ≤ /8, where y∗ is the optimal intervention. By the
triangle inequality this gives us that
∥∥∥ y∗‖y∗‖ − v1(A)∥∥∥ ≤ /4. Applying Lemma 1
and law of cosines gives a competitive ratio of 1− .
Proof (Proof of Lemma 1). First we give a general expression of the change in
welfare observed at equilibrium after some intervention y.
∆W (y; b, A) = W (y; b, A)−W (0; b, A)
=
1
2
((
M−1y
)> (
M−1y
)
+ 2
(
M−1b
)> (
M−1y
))
=
1
2
(∥∥M−1y∥∥2 + 2 (M−1b)> (M−1y))
By the law of cosines, there is some vector y′ with norm
√
2C (1− γ) such that
y∗ − y = y′. Let λM = λ1(M−1). We can then give an additive bound on the
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utility loss ∆U = W (y∗; b, A)−W (y; b, A):
∆U = ∆W (y∗; b, A)−∆W (y; b, A)
=
1
2
(∥∥M−1y∗∥∥2 + 2 (M−1b)> (M−1y∗))
− 1
2
(∥∥M−1y∥∥2 + 2 (M−1b)> (M−1y))
=
1
2
(∥∥M−1y∗∥∥2 − ∥∥M−1 (y∗ − y′)∥∥2) (substituting y = y∗ − y′)
+
(
M−1b
)>
M−1 (y∗ − y)
≤ 1
2
(∥∥M−1y∗∥∥2 − (∥∥M−1y∗∥∥− ∥∥M−1y′∥∥)2)
+
(
M−1b
)>
M−1 (y∗ − y) (triangle inequality)
≤ ∥∥M−1y∗∥∥ · ∥∥M−1y′∥∥+ (M−1b)>M−1 (y∗ − y)
≤ λ2MC ·
√
2 (1− γ) + ∥∥M−1b∥∥ · ∥∥M−1 (y∗ − y)∥∥ (Cauchy-Schwarz)
≤ λ2MC ·
√
2 (1− γ) + λM ‖b‖ ·
∥∥M−1 (y∗ − y)∥∥ (spectral rad. def.)
= λ2MC ·
√
2 (1− γ) + λ2M ‖b‖ ·
√
2C (1− γ) (law of cosines)
From our lower bound on C we then have:
W (y∗; b, A)−W (y; b, A) ≤ 2λ2MC
√
2(1− γ)
Further, we have that
W (y∗; b, A) ≥ 1
2
λ2MC,
as this is obtainable even if b = 0 by letting y∗ be the first eigenvector of M−1
associated with the spectral radius λM . Recall that social welfare at equilibrium
is increasing in b. We can then give a multiplicative bound on utility loss:
W (y∗; b, A)−W (y; b, A)
W (y∗; b, A)
≤ 2λ
2
MC
√
2(1− γ)
1
2λ
2
MC
= 4
√
2(1− γ)
and so
W (y; b, A)
W (y∗; b, A)
≥ 1− 4
√
2(1− γ).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 6). Let v be an eigenvector of A, and let λ be the
corresponding eigenvalue. It suffices to show that for any v and any i, k, if λ 6= 0,
then:
vi
vk
=
wi
wk
. (2)
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InG(w) graphs, an edge between vertices i and j is constructed with a probability
proportional to wiwj . As such, for any i, j, k it holds that:
Aij
Akj
=
wi
wk
. (3)
By the eigenvalue equation, for any i,
n∑
j=1
Aij vj = λvi,
and so for any i, k, by (3),
λ · wk
wi
vi =
wk
wi
n∑
j=1
Aijvj
=
n∑
j=1
Akjvj
= λvk
which implies (2) when λ is non-zero.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 7). This follows from Lemma 13 with κ = 0. We also
give a simpler direct alternate proof here, which may be of independent interest.
First, we observe that
‖Av(B)‖ ≥ ‖Bv(B)‖ − ‖B −A‖ · ‖v(B)‖ = µ1 − η, (4)
by the triangle inequality. We can write v(B) = φ1v(A) +φ2x, where x is a unit
vector orthogonal to v(A), and φ21 + φ
2
2 = 1, for some values φ1 and φ2. Since
x ⊥ v(A), its image under A can at most have a magnitude of λ2 = 0. That is,
‖Ax‖ = 0.
From our assumption, we can write
‖Av(B)‖ = ‖φ1Av(A) + φ2Ax‖
= ‖φ1Av(A)‖
= λ1φ1.
Combining with (4), we get that
µ1 − η
λ1
≤ φ1.
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We can then conclude that
‖v(A)− v(B)‖ = ‖(1− φ1)v(A) + φ2w‖
=
√
(1− φ1)2 + φ22
=
√
1− 2φ1 + (φ21 + φ22)
=
√
2(1− φ1)
≤
√
2
(
1− µ1 − η
λ1
)
.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 8). Let D be the matrix that has the same diagonal
entries as A and 0 everywhere else. First we observe that∥∥A−(A−D)∥∥ ≤ 1,
as all entries of D are bounded by 1. Whether or not we are deleting self-loops,
by applying the triangle inequality to the previous observation and Lemma 15,∥∥A−A∥∥ ≤√4w1 log(2n/δ) + 1,
which implies again by triangle inequality that
‖A‖ ≥ d˜−
√
4w1 log(2n/δ)− 1.
By our distributional assumption,
d˜ ≥
256
(√
4w1 log(2n/δ) + 1
)
2
By Lemma 7, it follows that
∥∥v1(A)− v1(A)∥∥ ≤
√√√√2(1− ‖A‖ − ∥∥A−A∥∥∥∥A∥∥
)
=
√
2 ·
∥∥A∥∥− ‖A‖+ ∥∥A−A∥∥∥∥A∥∥
≤ 2
√∥∥A−A∥∥∥∥A∥∥
≤ 2
√√
4w1 log(2n/δ) + 1
d˜
≤ 2
√
2
256
= /8.
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Proof (Proof of Lemma 9). The second-largest absolute eigenvalue can be defined
as
λ2 = sup
x⊥v1(A−D)
‖x‖=1
∥∥(A−D)x∥∥
≤ sup
x⊥v1(A−D)
‖x‖=1
∥∥Ax∥∥+ sup
x⊥v1(A−D)
‖x‖=1
‖Dx‖ (5)
Any vector x that is perpendicular to v1
(
A−D) can be written as
x = φ1v1
(
A
)
+ φ2u
Where u is perpendicular to v1
(
A
)
, and φ21+φ
2
2 = 1. Let d := v1
(
A−D)−v1 (A).
Since A has only one non-zero eigenvalue, we can apply Lemma 7 to get
‖d‖ ≤
√
2
(
1− µ1 − η
λ1
)
(6)
Where µ1 =
∥∥A−D∥∥ , λ1 = ∥∥A∥∥ , η = ‖D‖. We have, from the triangle inequal-
ity, ∥∥A∥∥− ‖D‖ ≤ ∥∥A−D∥∥
Or,
λ1 − η ≤ µ1
=⇒ 1− µ1 − η
λ1
≤ 2η
λ1
Putting the values for η = w1∑n
i=1 wi
, λ1 =
∑n
i=1 w
2
i∑n
i=1 wi
, and using (6), we get
‖d‖ ≤ 2w1‖w‖
Since, x is, by definition perpendicular to v1
(
A−D), we can write
v1
(
A−D) · x = 0 =⇒ d · x+ v1 (A) · x = 0
=⇒ φ1 = v1
(
A
) · x = −d · xb
Using Cauchy-Schwarz, we get that |φ1| ≤ ‖d‖ ≤ 2w1‖w‖ . Thus,
Ax = φ1λ1v1
(
A
)
+ φ2 · 0
(
∵ u ⊥ v1
(
A
)
=⇒ u ∈ ker (A))
=⇒ ∥∥Ax∥∥ ≤ 2w1λ1‖w‖
Combining with (5), and noting the fact the eigenvalues of D are all less than
1, we get the result.
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Proof (Proof of Theorem 2). If the stated conditions hold, then with probability
at least 1−δ, all desired bounds on eigenvalues and norms are obtained simulta-
neously by Theorem 6. First we see that this implies a constant-factor separation
between λ1 and λ2 for the realized adjacency matrix. This ensures that βλ1 < 1
by our condition on β. From the proof of Lemma 8 we know that
λ1 ≥ d˜−
√
4w1 log(2n/δ)− 1,
and from Lemma 10, we know that
λ1 ≤ 2w1d˜‖w‖ +
√
4w1 log(2n/δ) + 1
≤ d˜
3
+
√
4w1 log(2n/δ) + 1.
For any  < 1 and δ < 12 this implies that λ1 >
5
6 d˜ and λ2 <
5
12 d˜, and so
λ1
2 > λ2.
We can use this to show a bound on the spectral gap of M−1 which allows us to
apply Lemma 14:(
α2
α1 − α2
)2
=
(
1/(1− βλ2)2
1/(1− βλ1)2 − 1/(1− βλ2)2
)2
=
 1(
1−βλ2
1−βλ1
)2
− 1

2
≤
 1(
1−0.5βλ1
1−βλ1
)2
− 1

2
(λ1 ≥ 2λ2)
≤ 1
(βλ1)2
. (7)
where the final inequality holds by noting that equality holds only at βλ1 = 1.25,
and that (7) is larger for all βλ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, if
C ≥ 2 ‖b‖
2
(/(8
√
2))2
·
(
α2
α1 − α2
)2
=
256 ‖b‖2(
βd˜
)2 ,
then ρ(y∗, v1(A)) ≥
√
1− (/(8√2))2 by Lemma 14. Applying the inequality√
1− x ≥ 1− x for x ∈ [0, 1], we have that ρ(y∗, v1(A)) > 1− (/(8
√
2))2 = 1−
2/128. Scaling y∗ to the unit vector y
∗
‖y∗‖ and applying the law of cosines, we get
that
∥∥∥ y∗‖y∗‖ − v1(A)‖v1(A)‖∥∥∥ ≤ /8. From Lemma 8, we also have that ∥∥∥v1(A)− w‖w‖∥∥∥ ≤
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/8. By the triangle inequality this gives us that
∥∥∥ y∗‖y∗‖ − w‖w‖∥∥∥ ≤ /4. Applying
Lemma 1 and law of cosines gives a competitive ratio of 1− .
Proof (Proof of Lemma 11). When considering G(n, p) graphs where self-loops
are added with probability p, this is equivalent to the G(w) graph distribution
with wi = np for all i. We give sufficient conditions for applying Lemma 8,
which holds even if we do not allow self-loops. We can compute the second-order
average expected degree as:
d˜ =
∑
i w
2
i∑
i wi
=
n2p3
np2
and then can see that
256
(√
4w1 log(2n/δ) + 1
)
2
≤ 256
√
6w1 log(2n/δ)
2
≤ 768
√
6
2
· √np, (p ≥ 4
9
log(2n/δ))
and so whenever n is at least (7862 · 6/4), we will have that d˜ = np is suffi-
ciently large. We already have the required bound on the maximum expected
degree, which in fact holds for all expected degrees, and so we can directly apply
Lemma 8 to obtain the result.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). In order to apply Theorem 2, we simply need to
show that the spectral gap is not too small, which previously followed from
the condition that w ≤ ‖w‖6 . If n is at least 36, this will hold for the G(w)
interpretation ofG(n, p) graphs (prior to removing the diagonal), as ‖w‖ = n1.5p,
so then ‖w‖w =
√
n ≥ 6.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 12). In [14] it is proven that whenever σ ∈ (2, 2.5), the
expected largest eigenvalue of a random power law graph is Θ
(
w3−σ1
)
, where w1
is the highest degree. If w1 is at least Ω
((
log(2n/δ
4
) 1
5−2σ
)
, then the largest eigen-
value will be Ω
(√
w1 logn
2
)
. With appropriate constants, we obtain the required
bound on d˜ = λ1(A) to ensure that deviations from expectation are sufficiently
small such that we can apply Lemma 8.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). By Lemma 12, the first eigenvector of the graph
is sufficiently close to its expectation. For power law graphs larger than some
constant, w‖w‖ <
1
6 will hold, and so the second eigenvalue will be small enough
such that, when applying Theorem 1 from [15], a spectral gap factor of 1/2 will be
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obtained almost surely. The bound above gives us a constant factor spectral gap
for sufficiently large constants, which allows us to obtain the same budget lower
bound as in Theorem 2. We can then combine these results as in Appendix A
to obtain the theorem.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2). If cosine similarity is small, much of the mass of the
intervention is in components orthogonal to y∗, whose efficacy can be upper-
bounded by the second eigenvalue of M−1. This bound will depend on the first
and second eigenvalues of βA. For some φ1, φ2 where φ
2
1 +φ
2
2 = 1, and for some
unit vector u orthogonal to y∗, we can write:
y = φ1y
∗ + φ2
√
Cu
∴W (y) =
∥∥M−1y∥∥2 = ∥∥∥φ1M−1y∗ + φ2√CM−1u∥∥∥2
= φ21
∥∥M−1y∗∥∥2 + Cφ22 ∥∥M−1u∥∥2 + 2φ1φ2 (M−1y∗)> (M−1u)
∴ W (y)
W (y∗)
≤ φ21 + φ22
α2
α1
+ 2φ1φ2
√
α2
α1
≤ γ2
(
1− α2
α1
)
+
α2
α1
+ 2
√
α2
α1
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3). From the G(w) version of the (, δ)-concentration
condition, we have that √
w1 log(n/δ)
2
≤ O
(
‖w‖22
‖w‖1
)
which implies that √
nw1 log(n/δ) ≤ O
(
2‖w‖2
)
≤ O (‖w‖2)
as ‖w‖1 ≤
√
n ‖w‖2 for any vector of length n. The difference in degree vectors
‖w − w∗‖ can be expressed as∥∥A1−A1∥∥ ≤ ∥∥A−A∥∥ · ‖1‖
≤ O
(√
nw1 log(n/δ)
)
,
where the last line follows from Lemma 15 and the (, δ)-concentration condi-
tions. From the analysis of Theorems 1 and 2, we can see that approximating the
first eigenvector of A to within O() `2 distance is sufficient for near-optimality,
which we have for the true first eigenvector by triangle inequality with w.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 4).
To see that there will be a giant component containing almost all vertices,
note that this follows from analysis of the giant component in G(n, p) graphs
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with p = 1n , as all probabilities in A are at least this large. A G(n, p) graph with
p > 1n almost surely has a giant component of size Θ(n). Consider the sampling
of all edges in such a graph except for those incident on vertex i. The expected
number of edges from i to the Θ(n) = n∗ size component will still be Θ(1/).
Each edge is included or excluded independently, and so the probability that
no edges are included is at most
(
1− O(1/)n∗
)n∗
≤ exp (−O(1/)). As this holds
for each vertex, the expected number of vertices outside the giant component is
n · exp (−O(1/)). A will be a block diagonal matrix with a block for each com-
ponent, and the largest eigenvalue will be associated with this giant component.
We concern ourselves only with this component in our mixing time analysis.
The mixing time of a graph A can be analyzed using the second eigenvalue
of its diffusion matrix. The first eigenvalue of P will be 1, and from Proposition
1 in [29], it follows that random walks on connected graphs have mixing time of
O (log(n/)) to within additive probability 2/n for each vertex, and thus  total
variation distance, if λ2(P ) is bounded by a constant factor below 1.
Observe that the second eigenvalue of P = AD
−1
is 0, as P has rank 1. A and
D will be close in spectral norm to their expectations for graphs satisfying (, δ)-
concentration, and the same will hold for D−1 when the minimum degree is large
enough. Note that n = Ω
(√
w1 log(n/δ)
2
)
by the (, δ)-concentration conditions,
as the first eigenvalue of A, which will always be less than n, must be at least this
large. Given the lower bound on w1, we then have that n = Ω
(
log(n/δ)
2
)
, with a
constant larger than 100. We can then apply Hoeffding’s inequality to see that
the true degree of each vertex will be within 12 of its expectation, simultaneously
with probability at least 1−O(δ). As such, for any vector v, the standard basis
components of D−1v and D
−1
are all within a factor of 2. We have already
seen that when a G(w) graph A satisfies (, δ)-concentration, Av will be close
to the projection of v onto v1(A), as λi(A)  λ1(A) for i > 1. Together with
the previous observation, this implies that the image of any vector will be close
under P and P . Thus, with high probability λ2(P ) will be bounded by a constant
less than 1, giving us our desired mixing time.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5). Our proof will proceed using Theorem 5 from [15] for
bounding the deviation of sums of Hermitian random matrices. Aˆ can be viewed
as a sum of O(m2) independent matrix random variables, with one variable for
each pair of groups. For each pair of groups, the matrix Aˆ with zeros for all
other group pair entries is symmetric and Hermitian, and the sum of all of these
matrices is Aˆ.
First, we show that each of these individual block matrices Aˆij has an em-
pirical frequency close to its expectation. By considering random variables for
each of the O(n2/m2) edges and applying Chernoff bounds, we have that
|pˆij − pij | ≤ O
(m
n
√
log(m/δ)
)
for all groups with probability 1− δ/2.
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To apply the theorem, we need to obtain a bound on
∥∥∥Aij −Aˆij∥∥∥, the ex-
pected and empirical block matrices for each group. All O(n2/m2) non-zero en-
tries in such a matrix equal will be, and will be bounded by O(m/n ·√log(m/δ))
as we have just seen. The first eigenvector for such a matrix will have O(n/m)
non-zero entries, each O(
√
m/n), and its product with the matrix will again
have O(n/m) non-zero entries, each of which will be O(
√
m/n · log(m/δ)). Thus
the spectral norm, equivalent to the corresponding first absolute eigenvalue, will
be O(
√
log(m/δ)).
Further, we need to bound the norm of the sum of the variance matrices
to apply the theorem, which we denote V 2 =
∥∥∥∑ij var(Aˆij)∥∥∥. For a matrix A,
var(A) = E[(A − E[A])2]. Each entry in (Aˆij − Aij)2 will be O(k(pij − pˆij)2)
where k is the number of edges in the block. The expected value of this is simply
k · var(pˆij) = pij(1 − pij)/k. Summing over all block variance matrices gives
us a matrix where all entries (other than the diagonal if self-loops are ignored)
are O(m2/n2); this matrix is n-dimensional, and so the spectral norm will be
O(m2/n).
By Theorem 5 from [15], with K = O
(
max
(
m
√
log(n/δ)√
n
, log2(n/δ)
))
:
Pr
[∥∥∥Aˆ−A∥∥∥ > K] ≤ O(n · exp(− K2
m2/n+K · log(m/δ)
))
= O
(
n · exp
(
−K log(n/δ)
K
))
≤ δ/2. (approp. constants)
This completes the proof.
D Analyzing Best Response Dynamics
We can see that the social welfare of the game acts as a potential function when
all agents’ actions are below equilibrium levels, and so we should expect selfish
agents to reach the new equilibrium after applying our intervention.
Theorem 5 (Convergence of Best Response Dynamics). When β > 0,
b > 0 and a0 < a
∗, repeated best responses of agents will converge to equilibrium.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Suppose β and all bi values are positive, and all
agents start with initial action levels ai = 0. This is below the optimal action
level for all agents, and each agent’s utility function is concave upon fixing all
other action values. When each agent best responds, they will increase their
action level towards the optimum value. Because β is positive, these increases
can only improve the welfare of all other agents. Social welfare increases upon
every best response, and thus best response dynamics will converge. The optimal
intervention β > 0 will always be non-negative for the graphs we consider, as the
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social welfare is an increasing function of b. We can again see that Best Response
Dynamics would result in asymptotic convergence to the new Nash equilibrium
after updating the bi values; all updates will be non-negative, and thus the social
welfare of the network remains a potential function for the game. If agents only
best-respond by more than  in a given round, convergence will be polynomial
in 1 and other relevant parameters.
E Further Preliminaries
E.1 Eigenvalue Transformations
We note some observations about the eigenvalues of graphs which satisfy the
assumptions from Section 2. For a graph A, eigenvalue λi corresponds to eigen-
value 11−λi in (I − A)−1 and 11−βλi in (I − βA)−1; corresponding eigenvectors
will be identical for both A and (I − βA)−1. We will refer to this latter matrix
(I − βA)−1 as M−1. Given that the spectral radius of βA is less than 1, 11−βλi
is decreasing in λi, and so the eigenvalues of M
−1 are ordered according to their
corresponding eigenvalues in A. Further, all eigenvalues of M−1 will be positive.
It follows that the spectral radius of M−1, which we denote by λM , is 11−βλ1(A) .
E.2 Imported Results
For completeness, we restate important results which we use in our analysis. A
key proposition from [20] shows that in the setting we consider, for large enough
budgets, the optimal intervention for a graph is close in cosine similarity to the
first eigenvector.
Proposition 14 (Proposition 2 in [20]) Suppose A is symmetric, the spec-
tral radius λ1(A) is less than 1/β, and β > 0. Then for any  > 0, if
C >
2 ‖b‖2

(
α2
α1 − α2
)2
then ρ(y∗,
√
Cv1(A)) >
√
1− .
We also state a key theorem about the spectra of random graphs.
Theorem 6 (Theorem 1 in [15]). For a random graph with edges constructed
independently according to A¯ and maximum expected degree ∆ ≥ 49 ln(2n/δ), with
probability 1− δ for sufficiently large n,
|λi(A)− λi(A¯)| ≤
√
4∆ ln(2n/δ)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
As noted in [16], implicit from the proof of Theorem 6 in [15] (where it is Theorem
1) is a deviation bound on the matrix norm. The result holds for all random
graphs with independent edges, and we restate it here for the special case of
G(w) graphs.
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Lemma 15 (Restatement of Theorem 1 in [15]). For a random graph with
independent edges A drawn from A, if the maximum expected degree dmax is at
least 49 log(2n/δ), then with probability at least 1− δ it holds that∥∥A−A∥∥ ≤√4dmax log(2n/δ).
